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"ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS"
UNDER THE AEDPA
William P. Welt
"At some point in the judicial process, even a person convicted of
heinous crimes deserves a rigorous and complete analysis of his con-
stitutional claims. If no state court provides such analysis, this task
falls to the federal courts."**
INTRODUCION
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA")
radically revised federal habeas corpus procedure in 1996. It "placed
a new restriction on the power of federal courts to grant writs of ha-
beas corpus to state prisoners,"' dramatically curtailing the ability of
federal courts to review state court decisions for constitutional error
and mandating that far greater deference be paid to those state deci-
sions. There can be no doubt that Congress intended to alter the way
in which federal courts reviewed state court decisions.3 However,
more than five years after the AEDPA became law, federal courts are
still adjusting to its restraints, as the Supreme Court and the Courts of
Apeals continue to work through the language of the statute, trying
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Bell v.Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 186 (4th Cir. 2000) (Motz, J., dissenting).
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000).
2 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring). I will refer to
this case as Terry Williams v. Taylor, or Terry Williams to avoid confusion with Michael Wayne Wil-
liams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000), another habeas corpus case from the 2000 Term.
3 See, e.g., Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 1997):
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to determine exactly how Congress intended federal habeas review to
work.
In particular, many federal courts are chafing under the restric-
tions of the AEDPA as they find themselves unable to decide federal
claims that state courts have reviewed only superficially. As these fed-
eral courts look to assert themselves, conflicts have emerged over
whether the AEDPA allows federal courts any discretion at all in re-
viewing state decisions under habeas corpus. I will be exploring the
development of this conflict, and in particular the debate over the
meaning of "adjudication on the merits" under Section 2254(d) (1) of
the AEDPA.4
In this Comment, I will argue that the Supreme Court must de-
termine the meaning of "adjudication on the merits" in the AEDPA
so that a uniform habeas process can be crafted. In Part I, I trace the
history of habeas, pointing out that the broadening and narrowing of
the writ generally corresponds to political pressure. In Part II, I dis-
cuss the AEDPA and its effect on habeas procedure. In Part III, I ex-
amine the Second Circuit's struggle with the meaning of adjudication
in the summer of 2001, and move on to consider the view of other
circuits in Part IV. Finally, in Part V, I critique the various definitions
and suggest that a speedy resolution to this debate is critical in order
to ensure the consistent and fair judgment of constitutional claims.
I. THE HISTORY OF HABEAS
The writ of habeas corpus serves a basic function, allowing federal
court review of a criminal conviction for constitutional errors, thus
ensuring fair and thoughtful application of the law.5 Despite judicial
and legislative alterations that reflect great changes in the legal con-
ception of habeas corpus, the writ has a long history of serving as a
fundamental protector of civil rights in the Anglo-American legal tra-
dition.
Described by Blackstone as "the most celebrated writ in the Eng-
lish law,",6 habeas corpus officially became English law in 1641.' It was
then carried across the Atlantic, embodied in American law during
4 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000).
Kenneth Williams, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: What's Wrong With It and
How to Fix It, 33 CONN. L. REV. 919, 921 (2001).
6 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129.
7 Williams, supra note 5, at 921.
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the colonial period, and ultimately guaranteed in the Constitution.8
After the Civil War, along with other measures strengthening civil
rights, Congress passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 allowing the
writ, previously only available to federal prisoners, to be used by state
prisoners as well."
Habeas corpus began its doctrinal transformation in the 1920s,
but ultimately became a viable means of litigating federal constitu-
tional claims arising from state court decisions under the Warren
Court.' Inevitably, there was a conservative reaction to this broaden-
ing of the availability of the writ. These commentators felt that the
Warren Court's decisions failed to consider the impact of such a
broadening on the resources of law enforcement and prosecutors."
The Burger Court, meanwhile, announced its concern with the bur-
den that a broad writ imposed on federal courts, using up resources
that could be devoted to other matters. 12 Additionally, members of
the Court expressed concern with what they considered to be the
newly transformed writ's assault on federalism." Ultimately, the Bur-
ger and Rehnquist Courts (particularly the Rehnquist court in the
late 1980s and early 1990s) began to curtail the writ, erecting barriers
that blocked the availability of habeas to those who did not meet
procedural obligations, and dramatically cutting down on the
number of defendants who could have their claims heard in federal
court.
4
II. THE AEDPA AND ADJUDICATION
In the wake of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City, there was a renewed effort to legislatively
s Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963). See also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2. ("The Privilege
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or In-
vasion the public Safety may require it.").
9 Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (1867) (amending the Act of 1866, ch. 80,
14 Stat. 46 (1866)).
10 Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2331, 2341-48 (1993). See also
Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sam,
372 U.S. 293 (1963). These cases were part of the general liberalization of criminal procedure
that the Warren court launched in the 1960s.
n Yackle, supra note 10, at 2351-52.
12 Id. at 2356.
15 Id.
'4 See Kenneth Williams, The Deregulation of the Death Penalty, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 677
(2000); Larry W. Yackle, The Figure in the Carpet, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1731, 1734-48 (2000). See also
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (setting conviction aside on habeas review);
McKleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (holding habeas corpus petition unsuccessful); Teague
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (denying habeas corpus petition); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977) (holding that there was no "cause" or "prejudice" for habeas corpus review).
[Vol. 5:4
"ADJUDICA TION ON THE MERITS"
follow in the Rehnquist Court's judicial footsteps, curtailing the avail-
ability of habeas corpus in order to fight crime and lessen lengthy
criminal litigation.'5 The procedural limitations on habeas imposed
by the Rehnquist court restricted the availability of habeas to defen-
dants who did not meet certain procedural hurdles. However, Con-
gress was interested in legislatively streamlining habeas and limiting,
in certain instances, the ability of federal courts to grant the writ at
all. 6 Ultimately, the Act achieved this purpose by declaring simply:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in cus-
tody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreason-
able application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determina-
tion of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court pro-
ceeding. 7
The statute clearly seeks to limit grants of habeas-this much is clear
from the plain language of the statute,' as well as the legislative re-
cord.' 9 However, the AEDPA does not clearly define the limitations it
places on federal courts' scope of review. Federal courts were simply
unable to discern Congress' intent, and consequently applying the
statute consistently, without clarification from the Supreme Court,
proved to be cumbersome.20
In Terry Williams v. Taylor, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve
an increasingly contentious split among the circuits.
2' The Court in-
terpreted the language of Section 2254(d) in order to clarify confu-
sion among the Circuits regarding the standard of review that federal
courts should employ when examining adjudicated claims on ha-
beas.22 In a long and rather complicated opinion written in part by
Justice Stevens and in part by Justice O'Connor, the Court finally ar-
ticulated what constituted "a decision that was contrary to, or in-
volved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
15 Williams, supra note 5, at 923.
16 Id.
17 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000).
18 Id.
19 See, e.g., Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 62-63 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi, J., concur-
rinq) (reviewing Congressional purposes in adopting standard of review for habeas cases).
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law" under Section 2254(d) (1).2 Disagreeing with Justice Stevens,
Justice O'Connor concluded for the Court that the "contrary to" and
"unreasonable application" prongs of Section 2254(d) (1) should be
applied separately.24 A federal court can grant the writ on the "con-
trary" prong if the state court arrived at a conclusion opposite that
reached by the U.S. Supreme Court on a question of law or if the
state court decided a case differently from the Supreme Court on a
set of materially indistinguishable facts.25 A court could grant the writ
on the "unreasonable application" prong if the state court identified
the correct legal principles as dictated by the Supreme Court, but un-
reasonably applied them to the facts of the petitioner's case.26
Terry Williams has done much to clarify the meaning of the AEDPA
and cure the circuit split over its interpretation, but the opinion
leaves open a gaping hole regarding what standard of review a court
should employ when a state court simply fails to apply federal law. In
short, while Terry Williams clarified the AEDPA considerably, it also
greatly reduced the ability of federal courts to finesse the meaning of
the statute, an action that had formerly allowed the courts to retain
much of their pre-AEDPA power. However, the procedural posture
dictated by Terry Williams applies only to cases covered by Sec-
tion 2254(d) and is thus limited by the statute's own language to state
court decisions "adjudicated on the merits."27 Petitioners wishing to
secure de novo review, and some courts eager to retain that power,
seized upon this confusion over the language of the AEDPA to argue
that, absent such an adjudication, de novo review was required. 2s How-
ever, the exact meaning of this phrase remains open to debate, and
as courts have attempted to apply Terry Williams and the AEDPA to
state court decisions that do not adequately discuss federal law, a cir-
cuit split and considerable intra-circuit tension has resulted.
It is important to understand that the debate over "adjudication
on the merits" is not simply limited to a linguistic meaning, and in-
deed the debate is not even confined to a consideration of what Con-
gress meant by the phrase. The dispute over adjudication is, in fact,
the next phase of a long battle over the meaning and role of habeas
corpus in the criminal process, the perceived abuse of the writ by
convicted criminals, and perhaps most importantly, the role of fed-
23 Id.
24 Id. at 404-05.
25 Id. at 405-06.
26 Id. at 407.
27 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000); Terry Williams, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
28 See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 163 F.3d 860 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that no claims presented
in the defendant's cross-appeal provided a basis for habeas relief).
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eral courts in state proceedings. Thus, what might seem on its face to
be a relatively limited question of statutory construction, is in fact a
very important debate that will have a direct impact on the criminal
justice system, and beyond that, broad implications on the larger de-
bate over the role of state courts in our federal system.
When a claim with a strong constitutional issue is presented to a
federal court on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the AEDPA, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Terry Williams, greatly constrains
the court's ability to review the decision." In an ideal world, of
course, a state court would have recognized and corrected the consti-
tutional violation, either on direct appeal or, in capital cases, during
post-conviction relief.
The belief that state courts will be vigilant in applying the Consti-
tution is the basis for the principles of comity and federalism that
have always limited federal review of state decisions on habeas corpus
appeal, and that were ultimately explicitly adopted in the AEDPA. °
However, the reality seems to be that valid claims are often over-
looked or under-analyzed by state courts."1 In these situations of sub-
standard state court review, a federal court which might have granted
the writ after reviewing the case de novo (as it could before the
AEDPA) would have to defer to the state court's reasoning, a decision
required under the AEDPA as interpreted in Terry Williams. However,
if the federal court finds that there was no state court adjudication on
the issue, the federal court is freed from the strictures of the AEDPA,
and can more directly address the constitutional claim de novo. Be-
cause the definition of "adjudication" affects the standard of review
See, e.g., Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 309-11 (2d Cir. 2001) ("By contrast, were we to
review the relevant state court decision under the deferential standards now prescribed by
AEDPA, it is plain that Sellan would not be entitled to the writ.").
30 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000).
31 See, e.g., Washington v. Shriver, 255 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2001) (reviewing Congressional pur-
poses in adopting the habeas standard of review); Neal v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683 (5th Cir. 2001)
(denying habeas relief where the state Supreme Court's conclusion that mitigating evidence of
petitioner's life experience at sentencing was cumulative but incorrect was not an unreasonable
application of federal law); Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the state
court's rejection of peitioner's motion for appropriate relief was not an unreasonable adjudica-
tion of petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim); Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 1999)
(stating that the deferential AEDPA standard does not apply where the state court does not de-
cide the claim on its merits); Mercadel v. Cain, 179 F.3d 271 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that peti-
tioner had failed to exhaust remedies where his ineffective assistance claim had not been fairly
presented to state courts); Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330 (7th Cir. 1997) (restating that a
court may not grant relief unless the adjudication resulted in a decision contrary to established
federal law); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that under the amended
federal law the court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences).
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under which the claim is examined, in many cases the threshold deci-
sion on adjudication is "outcome-determinative. 32
It is not difficult to perceive the many undesirable scenarios that
could result from the continued confusion over the meaning of "ad-
judication on the merits" in the AEDPA. A federal court reviewing a
state decision that it feels incorrectly denied a constitutional claim
may attempt to review the claim de novo by finding that the state court
failed to adjudicate on the merits. Perhaps worse, a federal court un-
able to grant habeas on a particularly strong constitutional claim be-
cause the claim was definitely adjudicated might instead grant the
writ on a weaker claim that was not adjudicated, merely because it
could wield its de novo review power. Similarly, state courts, aware of
the deference their opinions, will receive under the AEDPA on ha-
beas review-if only their decisions are not demonstrably unreason-
able or contrary to federal law-might be tempted to give strong con-
stitutional claims short shrift in order to give the federal habeas court
less of a record to review, which consequently limits the ability of a
federal court to find an unreasonable application of Supreme Court
precedent.
In perhaps the worst scenario, state supreme courts might be
tempted to summarily reject strong constitutional claims for fear that
an extensive decision would give the federal habeas court sufficient
grounds to make a finding of unreasonableness under Terry Williams,
and thus review the state decision de novo.3' I would argue that the
Great Writ has fallen considerably from its once lofty perch when
there is a risk of such judicial games being played.
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT
On January 5, 2001, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals an-
nounced a controversial decision in Washington v. Schriver. In Wash-
ington, the New York Appellate Division dismissed the petitioner's
Due Process and Sixth Amendment claims without specifically ad-
dressing the federal issues." The Second Circuit's opinion in Wash-
ington held that Terry Williams could not be applied when the state
court decision under review did not cite Supreme Court precedent or
32 Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 2001).
33 Judge Calabresi of the Second Circuit suggests several other reasons why the current con-
fusion over adjudication on the merits is unproductive. They will be discussed in the following
Part regarding the recent debate in the Second Circuit.
34240 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2001).
35 Id. at 106.
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at least state decisions that cited such precedent.36 The opinion also
held that state court judges would be required to undertake a thor-
ough analysis of federal claims in order to qualify for deference un-
der the AEDPA . 7 The decision provoked an uproar in New York,
where it was estimated that up to seventy-five percent of direct ap-
peals involved federal claims and that the additional analysis man-
dated by Washington would be "onerous."0s
In an unusual move, the same panel withdrew its opinion in Wash-
ington and issued an amended opinion on July 2, 2001, which decided
the case on different grounds, declining to render a decision on the
adjudication requirement of Section 2254(d).3 9 This time, the court
noted the two schools of thought on the adjudication requirement
but did not reach the issue, determining that Washington's claim
failed under any standard." The court noted in dicta that at least six
justices in Terry Williams seemed to endorse a definition of "adjudica-
tion" that would apply only if the state court in some way identified
the legal principles it was utilizing in the decision. 1
In a concurring opinion that addressed, and expanded upon,
many of the issues included in the original (withdrawn) opinion,
Judge Guido Calabresi made clear both his dissatisfaction with the
current confusion over the adjudication requirement, and his prefer-
ence for a definition of adjudication that would require state courts
to thoroughly examine federal constitutional claims citing Supreme
Court precedent.42 Calabresi wrote:
[W]e do State courts no favor by declining to determine, and as soon as
possible, that the pre-AEDPA standard of review should indeed be ap-
plied in cases like this one-cases, that is, in which State courts have re-
jected a petitioner's federal constitutional claim without specifically ad-
dressing it (even if only by citinf to federal case law or to State court
decisions that apply federal law).
While encouraging the Circuit to develop a standard for defining ad-
judication, Calabresi himself also advocated a stringent definition of
36 Id. at 108.
37 Id. at 107-10.
John Caher, Circuit Lifts Burden On Appellate Judges: State Courts Need Not Address Every Federal
Issue, N.Y.L.J.,June 19, 2001, at 1.
.19 Washington v. Shriver, 255 F.3d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 2001).
40 Id. at 55.
41 Id. at 53. ("Another approach would find that unexplained, summary dismissals of federal
claims are not adjudications on the merits. This approach looks to the view of at least six jus-
tices in [ Terry] Williams v. Taylor that the substance of the state court decision should be exam-
ined . ").
42 Id. at 62 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
43 Id. at 61-62.
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adjudication, which would require state decisions to cite Supreme
Court precedent, or at least other state decisions which in turn cite
Supreme Court precedent, in order to qualify for federal court defer-
44ence.
In his analysis of the AEDPA, Calabresi reviewed the statute's legis-
lative history and noted that Congress had changed habeas proce-
dure in order to both end perceived abuses of the writ through end-
less litigation and ensure deference to co-equal state courts.
45
However, Calabresi found numerous possible negative effects stem-
ming from the streamlining of habeas procedure, noting:
[T] he AEDPA runs the risk of imposing a heavy, and sometimes un-
wanted and unmanageable, burden on State courts. Specifically, if
AEDPA deference were deemed automatically and universally to apply,
then that law would require extremely busy State court judges to figure
out what can be very complicated questions of federal law at the pain of
having a defendant incorrectly stay in prison should the State court deci-
sion of these complex questions turn out to be mistaken (but not unrea-
sonably so). Indeed, under such a reading of the AEDPA, the only alter-
native to this outcome would be the highly undesirable one of having
federal courts reviewing State court decisions on habeas frequently de-
clare such decisions to be notjust mistaken but also unreasonable a6
Calabresi concluded that, because federal courts would not be so
bold as to rampantly declare state court decisions unreasonable if a
strict construction of the AEDPA adjudication requirement were
adopted, state courts would be forced to decide numerous difficult
federal issues against their will.
47
Calabresi, however, fails to consider, as a threshold matter, that
the risks and burdens of changing habeas procedure are not his or
the court's to determine, and that the delineation of habeas proce-
dure is the province of the Congress, not Article III courts. Addi-
tionally, he fails to realize that state courts are required to adjudicate
the claims before them-there is no reason they should be encour-
aged by the Court of Appeals or a broader judicial policy to defer
44 Id. at 63.
45 Id. at 62.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 62-3:
State courts would inevitably be led to do a lot of work on all federal questions, no mat-
ter how difficult, in order to avoid mistaken, but not unreasonable, decisions. And they
would do so regardless of whether they wished to spend the time arriving at deeply
thought out judgments on such hard federal questions.
48 Yackle, supra note 10, at 2337-41 (noting that while both Congress and the courts have
influenced the development of habeas corpus, Congress has responsibility for drafting the law
of habeas corpus).
[Vol. 5:4
"ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS"
judgment to the federal courts. Indeed, the plain meaning of the
AEDPA, as well as governing principles of federalism, prevent the de-
ferral of judgment on direct or post-conviction appeal to another
court. ' The clear thrust of Calabresi's comment is that he does not
trust state courts to competently decide complex federal questions,
and would be far more comfortable leaving the claims to federal
courts.
The mistrust of state courts that characterizes Calabresi's dissent
seems to be an important, if unspoken, component of the argument
for a definition of adjudication that would require articulated reason-
ing by state courts. The end result of such a requirement would al-
most certainly be a decline in the number of state decisions that are
deemed to have been "adjudicated," thus leaving more constitutional
claims subject to de novo review by federal courts. However, this for-
mulation seems to defy the spirit of the AEDPA, and returns the ha-
beas process, at least for complex questions, to its pre-1996 formula-
tion.
Calabresi then moves on to consider his preferred interpretation
of the adjudication requirement, in which the citation of Supreme
Court precedent, or state decisions relying on Supreme Court prece-
dent, would constitute an adjudication, and thus trigger AEDPA def-
erence. ° He argues that this structure
presents State courts with a powerful linguistic device by means of which
they can command deference concerning the issues they wish to decide,
and pass on for de novo review the issues they prefer to avoid .... per-
mit[ing] them to exercise that control over their judicial resources which
a true respect for state sovereignty requires. 
5
Calabresi offers no support for his contention that states even have
the option of deferring judgment on federal claims, and while novel,
his theory that this shows true respect to state sovereignty rings hol-
low.5" Calabresi's support of sovereignty merely encourages state
courts to realize, of their own accord, that they are not competent to
decide federal questions.
49 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000).
50 Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 63 (2d Cir. 2001) (CalabresiJ., concurring).
51 Id.
52 See Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 314 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The notion that state courts may
absolve themselves of their duty to decide federal questions has no basis in the law. Under the
Supremacy Clause, state courts are obligated to apply and adjudicate federal claims fairly pre-
sented to them.") (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947)).
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The amended opinion in Washington sent shockwaves throughout
the Second Circuit. Though the panel backed off their original in-
terpretation of adjudication, Calabresi's concurrence made it seem
that the Circuit might ultimately be headed toward a strict definition
of adjudication, which some thought would waste judicial resources. 4
However, the matter was ultimately resolved quickly when, in August
2001, a different panel of the Second Circuit delivered its opinion in
Sellan v. Kuhlman.'
Sellan was a habeas appeal that urged the court to review its fed-
eral constitutional claims de novo because the Appellate Division in
New York had summarily dismissed the petitioner's claim without
comment. 6 The Circuit Court considered, as a threshold question,
what level of deference it was required to give to the summary dis-
missal under the AEDPA, and more specifically, "whether a state
court decision as to a particular federal claim can constitute an 'ad-
judication on the merits' within the meaning of AEDPA even when
the state court does not explicitly refer to the federal claim or to rele-
vant federal case law.
5 7
Writing for a unanimous court, Chief Judge John Walker, Jr. first
distinguished the case from Washington, and noted why the issue of
"adjudication on the merits" is such an important one, both for ha-
beas procedure generally, and in particular for those defendants with
capital sentences:
Sellan's Sixth Amendment claim is a forceful one-the state law argu-
ment that Sellan's counsel failed to raise on direct appeal is quite strong.
• . .Accordingly, were we to review Sellan's Sixth Amendment claim de
novo, we might well be inclined to grant the writ. By contrast, were we to
review the relevant state court decision under the deferential standards
now prescribed by AEDPA, it is plain that Sellan would not be entitled to
the writ .... In short, whether AEDPA deference applies here is all but
58outcome-determinative .8
Walker then moved on to consider the text of the AEDPA itself.
Rather than first examining legislative history, or the intent of Con-
gress in passing the AEDPA, Walker jumps right into the statute, not-
ing that, "When Congress uses a term of art ... we presume that it
speaks consistently with the commonly understood meaning of this
5 Caher, supra note 38, at 1 ("Six months ago, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit issued a decision that sent shudders through New York's appellate courts.").
54 Id.
55 Sellan, 261 F.3d 303.
56 Id. at 307-12.
.7 Id. at 311.
58 Id. at 310.
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term." '9 Examining the definition of "adjudication" in Black's Law
Dictionary, as well as Webster's, the court concludes that there is no
implicit requirement of either explanation or citation in order for a
decision to be adjudicated.60 The court, citing the Fourth Circuit's
definition of adjudication, simply notes that, when no explanation is
forthcoming in a state court decision, the federal court must focus its
review on whether the ultimate decision, not the reasoning, complied
with the Terry Williams test.
61
As noted earlier, one of the great weaknesses in the habeas proc-
ess under the AEDPA that a Calabresi-type formulation of adjudica-
tion attempts to remedy, is that federal courts deferentially reviewing
state decisions often have very little substantive legal argument or ci-
tation to base their reasonableness evaluation on. Walker concedes
that "a state court's explanation of the reasoning underlying its deci-
sion would ease our burden," but determines that the absence of
such reasoning does not change the role of federal courts in the ha-
beas process, as mandated by Congress in the AEDPA.6' This clearly
reveals the fundamental difference between judges like Calabresi,
who are perhaps wary of state court decisions generally, and in par-
ticular seem to be hesitant to defer to summary decisions, and judges
like Walker, who betray no particular feeling on the subject but in-
terpret the AEDPA rather rigidly to generally mandate deference to
state courts in all but the most extreme cases. Walker seems to have
determined that, under the AEDPA and Teny Williams, the chances of
granting a habeas petition are very slight, and that this is the will of
63
Congress. Calabresi seems equally determined to preserve a role for
federal courts in the habeas process-even if it means tweaking the
Circuit's definition of adjudication to ensure that state courts pro-
duce longer, more well-reasoned opinions.
Ultimately, one motivation behind the Second Circuit's formula-
tion may well have simply been a reluctance to express grave doubts
about the state court system's ability to fairly adjudicate claims.
64
Walker, for one, seems unwilling to pass such a critical judgment on
the New York state court system:
If we were to . . . infer that an unconscionable breakdown occurred
herein because the Appellate Division issued a summary affirmance
59 Id. at 311.
60 Id. at 311-12.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 312.
63 Id. at 308-14.
64 Id. at 312.
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rather than a written opinion, not only would this reflect doubt regard-
ing the capabilities of the New York courts as fair and competent forums
for the adjudication of federal constitutional rights, but this would also
place us in the position of dictating to state courts that they must issue
opinions explicitly addressing the issues presented or else face 'second
guessing' by the federal courts. 6'
Walker correctly points out that one of the fundamental reasons that
the AEDPA became law was that Congress was concerned that state
courts were not being given their proper deference. Walker follows
this legislative directive to its logical conclusion, finding himself un-
able to question the competency of the state court system to hear
constitutional claims, thus affirming their often dispositive role in the
habeas process. However, in articulating his support of the state sys-
tem, Walker fails to consider the not unrealistic possibility that state
courts will continue to avoid citing federal precedent in order to se-
cure deferential review and avoid reversal by federal courts.
Addressing Calabresi's concurring opinion in Washington directly,
Walker questions the validity of the form of words that Calabresi ad-
vocates could trigger deferential review.66 Walker contends that such
a formulation would encourage prisoners to submit federal claims in
a "cursory manner," which would allow them to exhaust the claims
while perhaps gaining federal de novo review when state courts grant
summary dismissal . Walker surmises that this would ultimately re-
sult in a system where state claims are decided in state court while
federal claims are preserved on state appeal, but ultimately decided
in federal court on habeas appeal-this division is not based on any
law, and indeed seems to contravene the Supremacy Clause.68
It is interesting that Walker seems to have great faith in the ability
of state courts to properly adjudicate complex questions on summary
judgment-indeed his opinion is premised on this assumption-but
he does not seem to have great confidence in the ability of state
courts to see through a petitioner's ruse of exhausting an issue in
state proceedings while tricking the state court into not adjudicating
the claim. He seems to be simultaneously confident in a state court's
ability to properly dismiss federal claims without comment or cita-
tion, and concerned that it might fall prey to a rather elementary le-
gal trickery. Additionally, Walker fails to consider the possibility that
state courts may be canny enough not only to grasp a petitioner's
65 Id. (quoting Capellan v. Riley, 975 F.2d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1992)).
66 Id. at 313-14.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 314.
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trick, but also might be able to utilize the AEDPA to their own advan-
tage-securing deference while purposely deciding the case with
minimal commentary in order to avoid any grounds upon which to
be found unreasonable on federal habeas appeal.
Additionally, in suggesting that petitioners may attempt to use
trickery to secure federal review, Walker does not reveal why federal
review would benefit a petitioner. One can surmise that the benefit
derives from the fact, which generally lies at the heart of this entire
debate, that federal courts reviewing constitutional claims de novo are
more willing to grant habeas petitions than state courts are willing to
overturn capital sentences on direct or post-conviction appeal.9
Curiously, in refuting Calabresi, Walker notes two arguments that
the Washington concurrence could have made, but did not. Walker
writes that Calabresi failed to argue that a rule giving broad defer-
ence to a state court decision without well-articulated reasoning
leaves open the possibility that federal courts will incorrectly decide
the reasoning behind a state decision or that such a rule might simply
make less work for federal courts. y He implies that such arguments
might be more convincing than those which Calabresi makes; yet the
ultimate decision of the court, endorsing the strict definition of adju-
dication, shows Walker found neither to be persuasive.
V. THE OTHER CIRCUITS
Other circuits have had an equally difficult time determining the
meaning of adjudication under the AEDPA, and this genuine confu-
sion highlights the serious need for Supreme Court clarification of
the issue.
A. The Majority View: The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits
The majority view of "adjudication on the merits," ultimately
adopted by the Second Circuit in the summer of 2001, has been ar-
ticulated in various ways by many circuits, but each definition is fun-
damentally similar. Each of the circuit courts that hold this majority
view has adopted a narrow definition of "adjudication on the merits,"
meaning that any decision whatsoever is an adjudication under the
AEDPA.
69 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 14, at 682 (discussing the numerous pressures on state courts
which make them less likely to properly review an appeal).
70 Sellan, 261 F.3d at 313.
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1. The Tenth Circuit
The Tenth Circuit appears to be a leader in articulating a literal
definition of adjudication, which would dictate deference for all state
court decisions. In Aycox v. Little,7" the court determined that it would
not need to defer to a decision that was not decided on the merits.2
However, in the case itself, there was no evidence that the state court
did not reach the merits of the claim in granting summary dismissal,
and the opinion thus qualified for deference under the AEDPA.
73
Lacking any articulated reasoning on which to base its review, the
court instead conducted an independent review of the record and
federal law to determine if the state decision was unreasonable. 4 Be-
cause the court ultimately found no evidence that the decision was
not based on the merits, it is unclear what sort of evidence the Tenth
Circuit might require to find there was no adjudication. After all, a
summary opinion would, by definition, seem to offer no evidence of
any kind as to its reasoning, which is, of course, the impetus behind
this entire debate. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit took pains in Ay-
cox to point out that its independent review of the record was not pre-
AEDPA de novo review but rather deferential, because relief could not
be granted unless the state decision was found "legally or factually
unreasonable. 75
2. The Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit has determined that, when a state court deci-
sion does not articulate the reasoning behind its ruling, federal
courts must nevertheless apply AEDPA deference automatically. Fed-
eral courts "may not 'presume that [the] summary order is indicative
of a cursory or haphazard review of [the] petitioner's claims.' 76 In-
deed, the Circuit clearly held that a summary order is in no way infe-
rior to a more reasoned oginion, and qualifies for equal deference
under Section 2254(d) (1). However, the Fourth Circuit does rec-
ognize that such deference is difficult to articulate in a well-reasoned
opinion, when the brevity of a summary order makes a state court's
71 196 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 1999).
72 Id. at 1177.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1177-8.
75 Id. at 1178.
76 Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 158 (4th Cir. 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting Wright v.
Angelone, 151 F.3d 151,157 (4th Cir. 1998)).
77 Id. at 158.
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own reasoning unclear.18 The Fourth Circuit has formulated a stan-
dard of review which seems to fairly balance the deference mandated
by Section 2254(d) (1) with the practical difficulty of deferring to an
opinion without any legal reasoning.79 Thus, federal courts in the
Fourth Circuit must:
conduct an independent examination of the record and the clearly estab-
lished Supreme Court law, but . . .must still "confine ... review to
whether the court's determination 'resulted in a decision that was con-
trary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
States." 8
With Bell, the Fourth Circuit embraced the view of adjudication
that most circuits have adopted, and explicitly rejected Cardwell v.
Greene,"' an earlier Fourth Circuit opinion that defined adjudication
as requiring a full independent review of the federal claims when the
state opinion had no articulated reasoning. Interestingly, while the
Cardwell court found the Virginia Supreme Court's summary dismissal
to be an adjudication, they nevertheless used the lack of articulated
reasoning to exercise independent review.82 The Bell court rejected
this interpretation of the AEDPA, noting that the Cardwell court "im-
properly equated the 'reasonableness' requirement of Sec-
tion 2254(d) with 'the quality of the reasoning, a formulation ren-
dered improper by Terry Williams.
8 4
The Bell court agreed with the Cardwell opinion that any state
court decision is an adjudication under the AEDPA, but determined
that rather than de novo review, a federal court must independently
review the record to determine if the state court decision was unrea-
sonable under Terry Williams.85 In short, the Fourth Circuit's standard
of review under Bell requires federal courts to examine the record,
articulate any possible reasons for summary dismissal of federal
claims, and then defer to these reasons unless they violate the rigor-
78 Id.
79 Id. at 158, 163.
80 Id. at 158 (quoting Bacon v. Lee, 225 F.3d 470, 478 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2254(d) (1)) (citations omitted).
81 152 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 1998).
82 Id. at 339 ("[B]ecause the state court decision fails to articulate any rationale for its ad-
verse determination of Cardwell's claim, we cannot review that court's 'application of clearly
established Federal law,' but must independently ascertain whether the record reveals a viola-
tion of Cardwell's Sixth Amendment right ... ").
83 Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d at 159 (quoting Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir.
1997)).
84 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
85 Bell, 236 F.3d at 158.
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ous "reasonableness" standards of Teny Williams. The court does not
comment on the troubling fact that this will require federal courts to
both articulate the reasoning behind the dismissal of an appeal and
then defer to their own reasoning on habeas, nor does it indicate
whether it finds this commingling of state and federal judicial re-
sponsibilities to be troubling.
Interestingly, the dissent in Bell concedes that a state court's sum-
mary dismissal is an adjudication, but still suggests that, because the
state court failed to articulate its reasoning, independent review of
the record is required just as it was in Cardwell."' In Bell, Judge Diana
Gribbon Motz contends that under the federal court's independent
review of the record the first step is to ascertain whether a constitu-
tional violation has occurred, and then to determine if the state
court's failure to find that violation was unreasonable.8 Recall that
the majority opinion in Bell held that a federal court must find all
possible reasons for dismissal and may only overturn the verdict if it
was improper under Teny Williams. 9 It is revealing that Motz opines
in her dissent that, "[u]nder the AEDPA, federal courts have no
business reversing even perfunctory state habeas decisions that are
'close' to the mark. A federal court must, however, find the mark
when the state court fails to do so by issuing a summary decision."90
The Fourth Circuit seems to disagree on exactly how courts should go
about finding that mark, and while it is clear that in the Fourth Cir-
cuit any state decision at all will suffice as an adjudication, there is
clearly disagreement over the amount of deference due to summary
dismissals.
3. The Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit has defined adjudication in a substantially
similar manner, holding that "[n]othing in Section 2254(d) calls on
state courts to fill their opinions with discussions that by their lights
are unnecessary, as the price of avoiding de novo review in federal
court."9  The Seventh Circuit has also determined that requiring
state court decisions to articulate their reasoning would, "place the
federal court in just the kind of tutelary relation to the state courts
86 Id. at 163.
87 Id. at 177 (Motz,J., dissenting).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 158-59.
90 Id. at 183 (Motz,J., dissenting ) (citation omitted).
91 Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 874 (7th Cir. 1996).
[Vol. 5:4
"ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS"
that the [AEDPA is] designed to end."92 Contrasting the habeas re-
view process with that of administrative agencies' decisions, which
must clearly articulate their reasoning, or be sent back to the agency
for reconsideration, Chief Judge Posner wrote in Hennon v. Cooper
that under the AEDPA,
[a] federal court in a habeas corpus proceeding cannot remand the case
to the state appellate court for a clarification of that court's opinion; all it
can do is order a new trial, though the defendant may have been the vic-
tim not of any constitutional error but merely of a failure of judicial ar-
ticulateness.9
While not mandating any particular method for dealing with a
lack of articulated reasoning, the Seventh Circuit clearly embraces
the view, shared by many other circuits, that any state decision is an
adjudication which should be accorded deference under the
AEDPA.94  The Seventh Circuit has not been particularly ground-
breaking in articulating a definition for adjudication or constructing
a framework which attempts to balance the rights enshrined in the
writ of habeas corpus with the demands of the AEDPA. However, it
has been more willing than most other circuits to explicitly concede
that the primary goal of the AEDPA is to severely curtail the discre-
tion of federal courts.95
4. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit has articulated a test which is facially very differ-
ent from that adopted by the Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits. In
Neal v. Puckett, the court wrote that "adjudication 'on the merits' is a
term of art that refers to whether a court's disposition of the case was
substantive as opposed to procedural."9 6 In Mercadel v. Cain,97 the
court determined that whether a state court's decision was proce-
dural or substantive should be determined by considering:
(1)what the state courts have done in similar cases;
(2) whether the history of the case suggests that the state court was aware
of any ground for not adjudicating the case on the merits; and
(3) whether the state courts' opinions suggest reliance upon procedural
98
grounds rather than a determination on the merits.
92 Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 1997).
93 Id.
94 See, e.g., id.; Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996).
95 Hennon, 109 F.3d at 335.
96 Neal v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683, 686 (5th Cir. 2001).
97 179 F.3d 271, 274 (5th Cir. 1999).
98 Id. at 274.
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The Fifth Circuit's test is different from that of other circuits because
it recognizes that a summary dismissal may be made on procedural
grounds."' But, format aside, the Fifth Circuit's test is substantially
similar to that of the Fourth and Tenth Circuits. Any substantive de-
cision, however slight, is an adjudication deserving deference under
the AEDPA.'00 So, while some state decisions which in other circuits
might be reviewed under AEDPA's strict standards qualify for de novo
review, most appeals would seem to meet the same fate as they would
in most other circuits.
B. The Divided Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit has not fallen into line with its sister circuits re-
garding a definition of adjudication. In Doan v. Brigano,'0 ' the Ohio
Court of Appeals dismissed a Sixth Amendment claim without refer-
ring to constitutional case law, instead relying on Ohio's evidence
rules. The Sixth Circuit held that:
Because the Ohio Court of Appeals did not even identify in its opinion
that Doan had a federal constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury
that considers in its deliberations only the evidence presented against
him at trial, the "unreasonable application" prong of § 2254(d) (1) does
not govern our analysis. The Ohio Court of Appeals did not, as the Su-
preme Court defined an unreasonable application, correctly identify the
governing legal principle only to unreasonably apply that principle to the
particular facts of the case at hand. On the contrary, the Ohio Court of
Appeals completely failed to identify Doan's Sixth Amendment rights in
its analysis, implicitly holding that Ohio Evid. R. 606(B) trumps the con-
stitutional arguments that the defendant raised.'0 2
The court then concluded that failing to examine Doan's claim un-
der the Sixth Amendment was unreasonable under Terry Williams be-
cause it was contrary to Supreme Court precedent.'
Though it is unclear, the Sixth Circuit seems to feel that ignoring
the constitutional claim is akin to ruling contrary to Supreme Court
precedent. However, the court does not reveal if this is because the
decision itself was contrary to precedent or simply because the Ohio
court applied Ohio evidentiary rules instead of Supreme Court
99 Id.
100 Neal, 230 F.3d at 686.
101 237 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 2001).
102 Id. at 730-31 (citation omitted).
103 Id. (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)).
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precedent. In any case, the court then examined Doan's Sixth
Amendment claim de novo.1
0 4
The Doan opinion circumvents the issue of adjudication as it has
been discussed thus far in this comment, but nevertheless addresses
several of the same substantive issues. Ultimately, the court was ex-
pressing its frustration over the strictures the AEDPA placed on it
when faced with a poorly-crafted state court decision. 0 5 The solution
created in Doan, which incorporates the reasonableness requirement
of Terry Williams, does not purport to deal with adjudication, but in
practice it is the same as the remedy which will be seen later in the
Third Circuit's Hameen0 6 opinion. Aside from the importance of
Doan as an expression of a differing view on interpretation of the
AEDPA, it is also notable simply as a case which clearly expresses the
contortions of law that federal courts will go through in trying to
bend the AEDPA so as to retain maximum power of review.
Aside from the confusing Doan doctrine, the Sixth Circuit has
embraced the Aycoxl °7 formulation used by the Tenth Circuit, which
calls for an independent review of the record and applicable law un-
der the AEDPA when faced with a summary dismissal that does not
reveal a state court's reasoning. 0 8 The court in Harris v. Stovall"
maintained that, "[w] here a state court decides a constitutional issue
by form order or without extended discussion, a habeas court should
then focus on the result of the state court's decision, applying the
[Aycox] standard.""0 The Harris decision implicitly accepts unrea-
soned state court opinions as adjudications despite the lack of articu-
lated reasoning, sidestepping the debate which has occupied the
other circuits.' Yet, ultimately, the Harris court was forced to deal
with the serious problem of having no state court reasoning upon
which to base its Terry Williams analysis."' Noting that a remand to
the state appellate court for clarification was impossible (just as Chief
Judge Posner noted in Hennon"3), the Harris court found that habeas
courts must focus on the result of the state court's decision."
4
104 Id. at 730-36.
105 Id.
106 Hameen v. Delaware, 212 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2000).
107 Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 1999).
108 Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir. 2000).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 943 n.1.
I Id. at 943.
112 Id.
13 Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 1997).
114 Harris, 212 F.3d at 943 n. 1.
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This discrepancy in the Sixth Circuit between the Doan and the
Aycox views has not yet been clarified, but it does reveal that more
than one circuit is troubled by the vagaries of the AEDPA.
C. The First and Third Circuits-More Radical Requirements
Finally, the First and Third Circuits have taken the most radical
path in defining adjudication under the AEDPA. In Fortini v. Mur-
phy,115 the First Circuit found that the state court had not addressed
the petitioner's constitutional claims and then reviewed the claims de
novo."' In Dibenedetto v. Hall,"7 the court dealt with a habeas appeal
from a state court ruling that had decided mixed claims based on
both state and constitutional law solely on state law grounds. The
court held that:
If the state court has not decided the federal constitutional claim (even
by reference to state court decisions dealing with federal constitutional
issues), then we cannot say that the constitutional claim was 'adjudicated
on the merits' within the meaning of § 2254 and therefore entitled to...
deferential review." 8
The First Circuit's definition of "adjudication on the merits" clearly
seeks to balance Congress's clear intent to limit the scope of federal
court review with the interest of habeas petitioners who may have
claims that have not been addressed by an court. Interestingly, but
not surprising under this balancing approach, the court has deter-
mined that if a mixed claim is decided solely on state law grounds,
where state law is more favorable to the petitioner that constitutional
law, the claim has been adjudicated and is due deference under the
AEDPA 19
The Third Circuit has moved just as aggressively in an effort to de-
fine adjudication more narrowly. In Hameen v. Delaware,'2" the peti-
tioner brought a habeas petition charging, inter alia, that the same
aggravating factor was weighed twice in his capital sentencing, in vio-
lation of the Eighth Amendment.2 ' In its opinion, the Delaware Su-
preme Court cited to its own cases, which in turn cited Gregg v. Geor-
115 257 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2001).
116 Id. at 44-45.
117 272 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001).
118 Id. at 6.
19 McCambridge v. Hall, 303 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002).
120 212 F.3d 226 (3d Cir. 2000).
121 Id. at 246-47.
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gia.122 Concluding that the Delaware Supreme Court had "read Gregg
v. Georgia too broadly, 123 the Third Circuit ruled that the Delaware
court had not taken into account Supreme Court precedent, and that
as a consequence, there had been no "adjudication on the merits."
The court then proceeded to apply pre-AEDPA de novo review to the
claim, ultimately dismissing the habeas appeal.
2 4
A subsequent case indicates that the Third Circuit is standing by
its definition of "adjudication on the merits.' 25 In Jermyn v. Horn,
the Third Circuit found that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's reli-
ance on a flawed lower court finding that improperly ignored one
prong of a petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim rendered the court's
ineffectiveness finding unreasonable, and thus not an "adjudication
on the merits.' '2 7 The Circuit found that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's failure to decide a properly preserved claim simply did not
qualify as an adjudication.
Most recently, in Chadwick v. Janecka 29 the Third Circuit clarified
and built upon its previous cases. Referring to the line of cases which
had rejected AEDPA deference where state courts had not properly
ruled on constitutional claims, the court stated, "[i]f an examination
of the opinions of the state courts shows that they misunderstood the
nature of a properly exhausted claim and thus failed to adjudicate
that claim on the merits, the deferential standards of review in
AEDPA do not apply.",30 However, the court also moved to limit the
reach of this aggressive interpretation of the AEDPA, finding a dis-
tinction between those cases in which the state court did not properly
hear a claim, to which deference would not have to be paid by a fed-
eral court, and those in which it rejected a claim without explanation,
to which a federal court would have to defer under the AEDPA." '
Unfortunately, the court's effort to limit the scope of Hameen seems
to create an incentive for state courts to summarily reject habeas ap-
peals, so that their opinions will not face rigorous pre-AEDPA de novo
review.
122 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding death sentence when two arguably duplicative aggravat-
ing factors were considered twice); see also Hameen, 212 F.3d at 247.
123 Id. at 248.
124 Id.
125 Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 280-81 (3rd Cir. 2001).
126 266 F.3d 257 (3rd Cir. 2001).
127 Id. at 299-300.
128 Id. at 300.
129 312 F.3d 597 (3rd Cir. 2002).
so Id. at 606.
131 Id. at 607.
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The First and Third Circuit's interpretation of the adjudication
requirement represents a distinct break from the requirements of the
other circuits. Only the Fourth Circuit in Cardwell,12 which the
Fourth Circuit has since repudiated,5 ' came close to formulating any-
thing similar. Recall that in Cardwell, while the court agreed summary
dismissal was an adjudication, it held that a lack of articulated reason-
ing prevented it from determining whether the Virginia Supreme
Court has unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent, and
instead exercised pre-AEDPA review.134  The First Circuit in
Dibenedetto1s5 and the Third Circuit in Hameen s6 go far beyond even
the liberal Cardwel s7 standard, seemingly requiring state courts to
reasonably apply federal law (as under Terry Williams) merely to qual-
ify as an adjudication.
V. RESOLUTION OF THE SPLIT
It remains unclear how the debate over adjudication will ulti-
mately be resolved. Indeed, it is important to realize that the true
debate is not over "adjudication" as an abstract concept-the circuits
are at odds, and indeed, judges within the circuits themselves clearly
disagree, on the meaning of adjudication because of its immediate
impact on the entire habeas corpus process. ChiefJudge Walker cor-
rectly observed in Sellan138 that determining whether a claim has been
adjudicated on the merits under the AEDPA and Terry Williams can
often be outcome-determinative. The great deference mandated by
the AEDPA habeas procedure dictates that those petitioners who
cannot receive de novo review will almost certainly see their claims
dismissed. 9
It is clear that many of the circuits are not even talking about the
same issue when considering adjudication. Many circuits have taken
the fairly direct view that adjudication is a word with plain meaning-
any decision will suffice. 40 This straight-forward analysis is fundamen-
132 Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d 331, 339 (4th Cir. 1998).
3 Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 158 (4th Cir. 2000).
M Cardwell, 152 F.3d at 339.
135 Dibenedetto v. Hall, 272 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2001).
136 Hameen v. Delaware, 212 F.3d 226, 248 (3d Cir. 2000).
:37 Cardwell, 152 F.3d at 339.M Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 2001).
139 Id. at 313.
140 See, e.g., Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 158 (4th Cir. 2000) (considering a state court decision
to be a full adjudication even if a rationale is absent and denying the presumption of a haphaz-
ard review by the state court); Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999) (considering
a decision to be an adjudication on the merits absent evidence to the contrary); Lindh v. Mur-
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tally different from the reasoning employed by those circuits and
judges who look to the spirit of habeas corpus or Congressional in-
tent in determining what adjudication is supposed to mean in this
specialized context. 4 ' Both approaches differ from those opinions
that frame the adjudication debate merely along substantive or pro-
cedural lines.'42 Finally, some decisions, while addressing the same
fundamental concerns as all the other opinions, do not address adju-
dication at all, and instead frame the issue as one of reasonable ap-
plication of Supreme Court precedent under Teny Williams.' 43 It is, of
course, conceivable that any of these methods is correct-and in fact
it is probable that more than one, if not all, are perfectly reason-
able-but this sort of debate nevertheless leaves the major issue unre-
solved: how should federal courts review state court decisions of
constitutional claims that do not fully articulate their reasoning?
As a threshold matter it would seem essential for the Supreme
Court to decide what qualifies as "adjudication on the merits" under
the AEDPA simply to force federal courts into some sort of agree-
ment on the issue. Such a decision, whatever it may be, would unify
the habeas process across the circuits, and do much to clarify the
AEDPA, which continues to befuddle federal courts as it moves into
its seventh year as law. It is interesting that, in the capital sentencing
context, the Supreme Court has long sought to remove any hint of
arbitrariness so that death sentences might comport with the Eighth
Amendment. As it stands now, because of the confusion over "adju-
dication on the merits" among the circuits, a simple difference of
definition could result in completely (and some would say arbitrarily)
different habeas rulings for similarly situated petitioners residing in
phy, 96 F.3d 856, 874 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that state court opinions should receive mere
deference if they are well-reasoned).
141 See, e.g., Washington v. Shriver, 255 F.3d 45, 61 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi, J., concurring)
(stating that the court, by declining to determine whether the pre-AEDPA standard of review
should be applied, did not do the state courts a favor); Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335
(7th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he criterion of a reasonable determination is whether... the determina-
tion is at least minimally consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case.").
142 See, e.g., Neal v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683, 686 (5th Cir. 2001) ("In the context of federal ha-
beas proceedings, adjudication 'on the merits' is a term of art that refers to whether a court's
disposition of the case was substantive as opposed to procedural.") (citing Green v. Johnson,
179 F.3d 1115, 1121 (5th Cir. 1997)); Mercadel v. Cain, 179 F.3d 271, 274 (5th Cir. 1999) (using
Green's substantive/procedural test to determine whether there was an adjudication on the mer-
its).
143 See, e.g., Hameen v. Delaware, 212 F.3d 226, 246 (3rd Cir. 2000) (finding that the court
did an adequate job of interpreting the Supreme Court and therefore review counts as an adju-
dication); see also Doan v. Brigano, 237 F.3d 722, 730 (6th Cir. 2001) (overturning the Ohio
Court of Appeals' dismissal of a Sixth Amendment claim relying on Ohio's evidence rules,
without referring to constitutional case law).
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different circuits. The continued existence of this divide should not
be tolerated.
While the Supreme Court would do well to quickly develop a
definition of adjudication in the habeas context, it is certainly unclear
which of the many options the Court might choose, or for that matter
which is best. It is, of course, necessary to first concede that whatever
option is chosen, it must comply with the AEDPA, which is the law of
the land, though many federal judges clearly chafe under its stric-
tures. That being said, the method used by the Fourth and Tenth
Circuits, which requires independent review of the state court's re-
cord in order to determine if the decision was unreasonable under
Supreme Court precedent, seems to be the most viable option.144
This independent review seems to best balance the statutory re-
quirements of the AEDPA with the need for federal courts to base
their review of state decisions on some substantive law and legal
analysis. The difficulty with this method is that it could often result in
federal courts formulating a number of plausible grounds for a cryp-
tic state court decision, and then deferring to one of them under Sec-
tion 2254(d)(1), even though the state court itself dismissed the
claim on procedural grounds or perhaps unreasonably applied an ill-
conceived legal theory. Additionally, this approach results in the
procedurally awkward result of a federal court deferring to itself, de-
spite its own best judgment, because the reasoning it supplies for the
silent state court is not unreasonable.
It would perhaps be desirable to graft onto the Fourth Circuit's
definition some sort of safeguard which would deny deference to the
most egregious state court decisions. This would do much to mollify
those, like Calabresi, who are clearly concerned with the perceived
inferiority of state court constitutional jurisprudence. However, I
cannot think of any safeguard which could be clearly formulated, be-
yond some sort of "reasonableness" standard that would ultimately
rely on a judge's discretion. Nevertheless, I stress again that dissatis-
faction with the AEDPA should not lead to excessive twisting of "ad-
judication" so as to neuter the statute or return too much power to
federal judges. However one may feel about it, the vast majority of
state decisions will be upheld on habeas under the AEDPA no matter
which definition is used.
14 See, e.g., Bell, 236 F.3d at 158 (considering a state court decision to be a full adjudication
even if a rationale is absent and denying the presumption of a haphazard review by the state
court); Aycox, 196 F.3d at 1177 (considering a decision to be an adjudication on the merits ab-
sent evidence to the contrary).
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CONCLUSION
The clear intent of Congress in passing the AEDPA was to force
federal courts into a deferential role in the habeas process, and so
they have done. Yet, federal courts have the essential responsibility,
obvious from even a cursory review of the history of the Great Writ, to
protect the constitutional rights of all citizens from encroachment.
The complexity of this debate and the great importance of the issues
at stake mandates that the Supreme Court quickly and forcefully re-
solve the serious circuit split over the meaning of "adjudication."
Once "adjudication" is defined, federal courts must then work within
the strictures of the Supreme Court's decision and the AEDPA to
provide a complete and thorough review of all state court decisions
presented on habeas appeal. Whatever the outcome of the debate on
adjudication, the writ of habeas corpus must continue to be our great
safeguard of essential liberty.
